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Corporates and Financial engineering: a few case studies
By Dr. A. A. Kotzé from Financial Chaos Theory
http://www.quantonline co.za

 

Abstract
orporates enter the financial markets as natural hedgers for their interest rate and/or foreign exchange exposures. Few companies, however, utilise the equity derivative markets to their advantage - to hedge certain corporate action events. In this exposé we will discuss three case studies to understand how equity derivatives are utilised by corporates to assists them in reaching their goals. In the first case study we will look at how Venfin used equity derivatives to fund a transaction. We will then turn to corporate warrants. In the second case study we will show how Richemont and Remgro used these instruments prudently to sell some of their tobacco interests. In the last case study we will turn to a transaction between UBS and LTCM. Here we will highlight the risks in using corporate warrants for the wrong reasons. Through the case studies we also learn that payoff diagrams are essential tools in understanding structured derivatives.

1. Introduction

The publication of the preference-free option pricing formula by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton in 1973 was a giant step forward in financial economics. Their model established the everyday use of mathematical models as essential tools in the world of finance. Since then option pricing theory has developed into a standard tool for designing, pricing and hedging derivative securities of all types. These tools are mostly used by speculators and the investor community where asset managers are looking for more effective hedging strategies or low risk gearing opportunities.

Corporates, on the other hand, make little use of equity derivatives. It is viewed as not being a natural part of their business. However, there has been an important shift recently in market share towards a growing use of equity derivatives by the corporate sector at the expense of the investor segment. This shift marks the coincidence of two processes: the sophistication of corporate treasurers and chief financial officers; and traditional capital markets that are often not conducive to effective asset pricing. These two factors have forced them to consider alternative financing tools.

Corporates' desire to de-leverage and clear the balance sheet of unpopular cross-shareholdings without indulging in a fire-sale or a rights issue means they are willing to look at other ways of monetising assets. The recent Enron-like debacles and new accounting standards have thrown the spotlight on equity derivative structures spurring a quantum leap in treasurers' knowledge of financial engineering.

Equity derivatives are now an integral part of the equity dialogue between banks and corporates. Reflecting this change, almost all the major banks have restructured to accommodate equity derivative specialists in their equity capital markets function. This avoids separate teams accessing the same company offering competing products [1].

In this exposé we will look at three real-world transactions showing that corporates can make effective use of equity derivative structured products; if these are used prudently.

2. Option Basics

A derivative is a treasury/capital markets synthetic off-balance sheet instrument derived from or bears a close relation to a cash instrument. We need derivatives because there are only two emotions that drive markets: greed and fear.

There are thus two types of traders: speculators and hedgers.

Now, speculators use derivatives to expose portfolios to some market risk and hedgers use derivatives to reduce the market risk they are exposed to. In technical terms we can say that derivatives make a market more “complete” i.e., investors have a bigger choice of instruments to invest in.

An option is a non-linear derivative of which we define two types: calls and puts. A call option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy the underlying asset by a certain date for a certain price. A put option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell the underlying asset by a certain date for a certain price. The price referred to is known as the exercise price or strike price. The date in the contract is known as the expiration, expiry, exercise or maturity date [2], [3].

An option cannot be obtained free of charge. There is a price attached to it called a premium. The premium is the price paid for an option. The buyer of an option pays a price for the right to make a choice — the choice to exercise or not.

Call and put options are defined in one of two ways: American or European. A European option can only be exercised at the maturity date of the option whereas an American option can be exercised at any time up and including the maturity date.

3. Payoff Profiles

For most options and option structures, the important issue for investors is what the possible payoff profiles look like. A payoff profile shows the investor the payoff that would be received if the underlying instrument is at its current level when the option expires. It also shows the investor the risk associated with the strategy: a future has unlimited profit potential, but such a diagram also shows the potential losses [2].

These profiles are popular because they clarify the profit/loss scenario (possible risks) through a simple diagram. They are also easy to work with because they are additive, meaning that we can add or subtract them from one another. This feature makes them useful in constructing more complex financial instruments or strategies [3]. For a derivative structure one will always look at the total or end profile. Figure 1 shows the payoff diagrams for long and short future’s positions while Figure 2 shows similar profiles for call and put options. In Figure 3 we show the profile for a capped collar. This structure is obtained by buying a future and at-the-money put and by selling an out-the-money call (a call spread can give a similar profile).


Figure 1: Payoff profile for a futures contract. K and K’ are the levels where the contracts were bought or sold.


Figure 2: Payoff profiles for options. K is the strike price


Figure 3: Payoff profile for a capped collar

4. Corporate Engineering – Venfin (jse;VNF)

In Venfin’s interim financial report for the six months ended 31 December 2002, the following was reported:

  • “On 31 December 2002, VenFin exercised the put option acquired from Merrill Lynch International in respect of 51 858 000 Richemont depositary receipts held by VenFin (“the Richemont transaction”). The total cash proceeds realised by VenFin as a result of exercising the put option amounted to R945.2 million. A capital surplus of R348 million was realised and is accounted for as an exceptional item.”
  • “VenFin acquired from Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited (HCI) an additional 1.5% interest in Vodacom with effect from 31 December 2002 for a total consideration of R450 million. The proceeds from the Richemont transaction were in part used to settle this amount. At 31 December 2002, VenFin’s interest in Vodacom was 15.0%”.
  • “During April 2000 VenFin granted an indirect, interest-free loan of R281.8 million to Sabido (Proprietary) Limited (Sabido), the holding company of e-tv. An additional R38.6 million was advanced to HCI for e-tv during the 2002 financial period. During January 2002, VenFin advanced a further loan of R280 million to HCI. This loan was interest bearing and fully secured. During September 2002 R199.4 million of this interest-bearing loan was converted into an interest-free loan to HCI for e-tv. The balance of the loan was repaid on 31 December 2002. If the interest-free loans to Sabido and HCI were to be converted into equity in Sabido on 31 December 2002, VenFin’s indirect interest in e-tv would be 33.1%”.

Three corporate actions were announced through SENS announcements on 29 August 2002, 9 September 2002 and 16 January 2003. The 9 September announcement stated
“VenFin has acquired a put option from Merrill Lynch International (MLI) in respect of 51 858 000 Richemont depositary receipts held by VenFin; and MLI has acquired a call option from VenFin in respect of 51 858 000 Richemont depositary receipts held by VenFin”.

Through these announcements we learnt that Venfin used equity derivatives in these corporate action events. These events were also linked. We will now explain how they were linked and what was achieved [4].

4.1 History

In 1993 the then Rembrandt Group invested R100 million into a new company called Vodacom. Vodacom successfully tendered to obtain one of only two cell phone licenses issued by the South African government. This investment secured 15% shareholding in Vodacom for Rembrandt. The other shareholders were Telkom (50%) and Vodafone from the United Kingdom (35%).

In 1995 Rembrandt sold 1.5% and Vodafone 3.5% of their shareholding in Vodacom to a black empowerment company called Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited (HCI). Rembrandt received R90 million for its 1.5% stake.

On 26 September 2000, Rembrandt Group split into Remgro Limited and Venfin Limited. Venfin inherited 2% of Richemont’s share capital with the split. This shareholding was non-stategic. Venfin also inherited the 13.5% shareholding in Vodacom.

During 2002 HCI has drawn loan funding from Venfin of some R600 million to recapitalise e-tv.

4.2 Sound Investments and associated Risks

Venfin realized the potential of e-tv and wanted to obtain a shareholding there-in. Venfin also wanted to increase its shareholding in Vodacom that was, at that point of time, extremely successful and profitable. The loan of some R600 million to HCI set a series of transactions in motion during August of 2002 to achieve these goals by 31 December 2002.
Venfin used the loan to cash-strapped HCI as an effective negotiating tool in convincing HCI to part with its 5% stake in Vodacom and to convert the loan into equity. After the conversion Venfin owned 33.1% of e-tv (indirectly through Sabido Investments).

Venfin needed to raise R450 million to fund the 1.5% of Vodacom that it wanted to buy from HCI. Venfin had various options like taking a loan from a bank. However, it had the non-strategic stake in Richemont that it could use. A simple solution could have been to sell shares at beginning of September 2002, put the proceeds on deposit and buy the 1.5% stake on 31 December 2002.

However, Venfin knew that Richemont was going to declare a dividend during September 2002 – they did not want to compromise that tax-friendly income. Venfin needed to find a way to sell the Richemont shares and secure their dividend income at the same time. Venfin was also fully aware of the risk that negotiations might fail – they needed to consider that risk as well.

4.3 An Innovative Funding Structure

Instead of selling the shares outright, Venfin put a zero cost collar in place. They bought a put on 51 858 000 Richemont shares from Merrill Lynch International. The put was struck at R18.22. Venfin then wrote an out-the-money call on the same Richemont shares – the call’s strike price was never disclosed. The expiration date of the structure was 31 December 2002. Venfin’s final payoff diagram is depicted by the red profile in Figure 4. This can be written as

Speaking on Moneyweb’s Classic Business radio show , David Shapiro said the financing arrangement was called a collar and involved Venfin putting up the shares as security for a loan from Merrill Lynch. Shapiro described the arrangement as a “new, innovative way in which to loan money and to protect collateral”.


Figure 4: Venfin’s payoff profile by using a structured derivative approach to funding.

4.4 An Efficient Hedge

Venfin used their holding in Richemont in an innovative manner to fund the purchase of HCI’s Vodacom’s stake. What has Venfin achieved through putting such a structure in place?

  • If negotiations failed Venfin did not have to exercise the put option.
  • Venfin kept all its rights until the deal was finalised on 31 December 2002.
  • Richemont declared a dividend with LDT date on 27 September 2002 (payable on 11 October 2002). This structure ensured that Venfin received the dividend amounting to R17,076,839.40 (tax benefit).
  • On 31 December 2002 Richemont’s share price was R15.90. Venfin thus financed the deal at R18.22. Their total income was R945.2 million. They obtained these funds without sacrificing the dividend and they kept a door open if negotiations failed.
  • Part of the income from the structure was used to pay HCI R450 million for a 1.5% stake in Vodacom.

Venfin enlarged their stake in Vodacom by, efficiently, using a non-strategic investment in Richemont

5. Corporate Warrants: Richemont (jse;RCH) and Remgro (jse;REM)

A corporate warrant is different to a retail warrant trading on a bourse like the JSE Securities Exchange. Retail warrants are issued by independent financial institutions – there is no resultant effect on the issued share capital of the underlying company.
On the other hand, corporate/company warrants, are issued by the company itself on its own stock [2]. If corporate warrants are exercised, the company receives cash (company’s value increases) as well as the number of shares on issue increases.

There are many advantages in issuing corporate warrants:

  • Cheap way to raise capital – the company receives the premium upfront and capital later.
  • There is more certainty in the capital-raising program.
  • The issuing company does not have to pay any dividends until the warrants are exercised.

5.1 Rembrandt’s and Richemont’s Tobacco Interests

Rembrandt entered the South African cigarette and tobacco industry in 1948 and in the fifties expanded their tobacco interests abroad through the establishment of various international partnerships. In 1972, the overseas tobacco interests were consolidated in Rothmans International, which was listed on the London Stock Exchange .

Rembrand separated its local and overseas interests in 1988 with the founding of Compagnie Financière Richemont AG (Richemont) – a Swiss-listed luxury goods group which then also acquired the shares in Rothmans International. During 1989 Richemont also acquired Philip Morris' 30 per cent interest in Rothmans International.

In 1995 Rembrandt Group and Richemont consolidated their respective tobacco interests in Rothmans International – the world’s fourth largest cigarette manufacturer. During June 1999 Rothmans merged with British American Tobacco Plc (BAT) to form the world’s second largest cigarette producer.. Rembrandt’s and Richemont’s investment in BAT is held through R&R Holdings (a Luxembourg based company) – Rembrandt and Richemont held 33 1/3% and 66 2/3% respectively. R&R owned 31.5% of BAT. During August 2000, Rembrandt split into Remgro and Venfin. Remgro inherited Rembrandt’s tobacco interests.

5.2 Structure of R&R’s Holding in BAT

R&R’s stake in BAT was split into 26.5% ordinary shares and 5% preference shares with embedded put options at a strike of 675p. The preference shares amounted to some 120.9 million shares and the put options expired on 7 June 2004. Another condition was that the preference shares automatically converted into ordinary shares on a one to one basis on any sale to a third party.

5.3 Remgro and Richemont’s Goal

Both Remgro and Richemont wanted to lighten their exposure to the tobacco sector. On 11 December 2002 Remgro and Richemont issued separate but similar SENS announcements reading:
“Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA (RCH) announces that its subsidiary, R&R Holdings SA is to offer 120.9 million secured European-style call warrants exercisable only upon maturity, at the option of the warrant holder, into ordinary shares of British American Tobacco p.l.c. (‘BAT’). The warrants, which will expire in May 2004, are exercisable at 675p per warrant.”

In Remgro’s financial report for the year ended 31 March 2003 the following was stated:
“In January 2003, R&R issued secured call warrants exercisable into ordinary shares of BAT in 2004. This transaction effectively locked in the value of the 120.9 million convertible redeemable preference shares which R&R has in BAT and which it was obliged to either sell or tender for redemption in June 2004 at the redemption price of 675 pence per share. Together with the gross warrant premium of 34.29 pence per share received in January 2003, the value locked in amounted to 709.29 pence per share, before costs..… As a consequence of the warrant issue, the preference shares are now treated as a debt instrument in the consolidated accounts of R&R and are no longer equity accounted.”

By issuing the warrants R&R locked in the value of the preference shares. The warrants transformed R&R’s market exposure to the BAT share price into a debt instrument. How was that achieved? We explain this by looking at the resultant payoff profile.

5.4 The Resultant Structure

We digress slightly to define a useful concept called put-call-parity. This is a fundamental relationship in option pricing theory [2]. Put-call parity is a relationship that exists between the prices of European put and call options where both have the same underlier, strike price and expiry date. Accordingly, we have the price equality:

where:
c = the current market value of a call;
PV(k) = the present value of the strike price , discounted from the expiration date at a suitable risk free rate ;
p = the current market value of the put;
s = the current market value of the underlier.


Figure 5: R&R’s synthetic call position


Figure 6: Resultant payoff after issuing corporate warrants

5.5 An Effective Hedge

In June 2004, R&R Holdings received GBP 816 million, due to the exercise of the warrants by the warrant holders. By issuing warrants R&R

  • Earned premium income;
  • had a guaranteed buyer of its 5% stake in BAT;
  • locked in the selling price guaranteeing the income of GBP 816 million.

The rationale behind the issued warrants was that R&R wanted to sell its 5% stake in BAT. It had a structure in place that in essence was a synthetic call option. This option had some time to run until its expiry date of June 2004. Options have time value and R&R sold the time value and option rights embedded in the synthetic call, realising it early. The payoff profile shows that R&R’s resultant position was square - R&R had no price risk to the BAT share price and hence R&R could treat the structure as a debt instrument in its financial reports.

Issuing warrants was a conservative strategy to effectively hedge and sell its 5% stake in BAT.

6 Corporate Warrants: LTCM vs. UBS
6.1 A Short History on LTCM

Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund located in Greenwich, Connecticut. The founders included two Nobel Prize-winning economists, Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton. The idea behind LTCM was quite simple to articulate but not necessarily that easy to implement. LTCM was to look for arbritage opportunities in markets using computers, massive databases and the insights of top-level theorists. By creating hedged portfolios the risks could be reduced to low levels. According to the model developed by Merton the risk could be reduced to zero, but in practice some of the crucial assumptions of Merton's model did not hold so the risk of the hedged portfolios was not really zero, as subsequent events proved [5].

LTCM's main strategy was to make convergence trades. These trades involved finding securities that were mispriced relative to one another, taking long positions in the cheap ones and short positions in the rich ones. There were four main types of trade:

  • Convergence among U.S., Japan, and European sovereign bonds;
  • Convergence among European sovereign bonds;
  • Convergence between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. government bonds;
  • Long positions in emerging markets sovereigns, hedged back to dollars.

Because these differences in values were tiny, the fund needed to take large and highly leveraged positions in order to make a significant profit. At the beginning of 1998, the fund had equity of $5 billion and had borrowed over $125 billion — a leverage factor of roughly thirty to one.

From the above we see that LTCM was mostly involved in the bond markets where it played the credit spread between mortgage-backed securities or double-A corporate bonds and government bonds. Then it ventured into equity trades. It sold equity index options with big premium income for 1997. It took speculative positions in takeover stocks and it played big in the Russian debt markets [6]. At one point, Russia was nearly 8% of its book; that amounted to $10 billion!

6.2 LTCM’s Collapse

LTCM’s woes started on 17 August 1998 when Russia devalued the rouble and declared a moratorium on 281 billion roubles ($13.5 billion) of its Treasury debt. The result was a massive "flight to quality", with investors flooding out of any remotely risky market and into the most secure instruments within the already "risk-free" government bond market. Ultimately, this resulted in a liquidity crisis of enormous proportions, dealing a severe blow to LTCM's portfolio. By 23 September 1998, LTCM was near collapse with investors loosing millions of dollars.

On Saturday 26 September 1998, the International Herald Tribune, reported that the biggest losses due to the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) amounted to

  • Credit Suisse, Europe's sixth-biggest bank - $55 million
  • Dresdner Bank - $142.6 million
  • Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), the world's second-largest bank - 950 million Swiss francs ($682 million).

6.3 The Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) Connection

Why did UBS lost so much money due to the failure of a hedge fund? The answer lied in the fact that LTCM was an extremely successful hedge fund making excessive returns for its investors. This success brought LTCM and UBS together and both parties saw they had complementary goals:

  • UBS wanted to buy a significant stake in this successful fund. That was very difficult to achieve.
  • On the other hand, LTCM’s partners wanted to convert foreign interest income from their offshore hedge fund into capital gains and defer it for seven years.

The deal was a variation on other attempts to turn a hedge fund into a securitized asset class with a protected downside. UBS took on the risk and protected the downside. The sweetener for UBS was a structure that looked more like an option than a loan, turning any income into a capital gain, and an opportunity to invest directly into LTCM. UBS saw great opportunity in rolling this structure out to other hedge funds.

The deal solved a tax problem faced by LTCM and other hedge funds: most funds are set up as partnerships or limited liability corporations. Income from the fund flows directly to the partners in the form of short-term profits or interest and dividends, which are taxed at 39.6 percent. Long-term capital gains, by contrast, are taxed at 20 percent.

6.4 The UBS Deal

For a premium of $300 million UBS sold to the LTCM partners a seven-year European call option or warrant, on 1 million of LTCM's own shares, valued then at $800 million. The strike price of the option was set at 80 percent of the forward value of LTCM at the time the transaction was struck. This amounted to $575 million.

To hedge the position UBS bought $800 million worth of LTCM shares directly from the partners themselves. UBS invested the premium of $300 million directly back into LTCM. Such an investment had to be held for a minimum of three years. Any shares sold by UBS back to the LTCM partners had to be converted into a loan at par value. The trade was approved at the highest level of management within UBS—the CEO, the head of credit and the head of the derivatives group. The trade also received board approval.

This transaction was completed in three tranches in June, August and October 1997. UBS booked an estimated $30 to $50 million of profit up front.

6.5 A Clever Deal

The premium was calculated such that it was equivalent to a coupon of Libor plus 50 basis points on $800 million paid over the seven years – this amounted to $300 million. Why was this the case and why did LTCM fell for such a deal? LTCM secured $800 million new investment capital at Libor plus 50 basis points. Due to its risky trading activities LTCM could never borrow money at those levels. LTCM also had a call on all returns above that level. UBS's obligation to convert any shares it wanted to sell into a loan provided LTCM with a synthetic seven-year put on its own performance. From LTCM’s point of view it was a real clever deal.

On the other side, UBS would have gotten its capital back after 7 years by selling the shares at the strike price of $575 million. It also secured an opportunity to invest into the hedge fund. The payoff profile of this transaction is shown in Figure 7. This clearly shows the risk UBS took onto its book.

By doing the deal UBS was long LTCM shares and short a call on LTCM shares. Put-call-parity states that such two trades together are equivalent to a short synthetic put option. This is shown by the resultant payoff diagram (red profile) in Figure 7. Being short a put is a very risky strategy. A proper hedge for a short put is a short position in the underlying share – delta hedging is done by selling the underlying share.


Figure 7: UBS’s resultant position after the transaction

6.6 UBS’s Risk Management

The risk managers at UBS should have known about put-call-parity and they should have known how a short put position should be hedged. This would have led them to notice that the main risk lied in the illiquidity of the LTCM shares. Proper stress tests and scenario analysis would have pointed to the possible losses if the LTCM share price did collapse. However, UBS’s risk managers never considered the possibility of a collapse of LTCM.

But, when Russia defaulted on some of its loans, share markets around the world went into a tailspin. During crash situations liquidity dries up and LTCM’s share was no exception to this generally accepted rule. UBS could not delta hedge its short synthetic put by selling LTCM shares in the open market. LTCM’s share price collapsed and UBS lost $682 million. The LTCM fiasco is full of lessons about:

Model and liquidity risk;

  • Unexpected correlation or the breakdown of historical correlations;
  • The need for stress-testing combined with sound judgment;
  • The value of disclosure and transparency;
  • The danger of over-generous extension of trading credit.

Driven by greed and the wrong reasons UBS bypassed proper risk management practices and lost $682 million by issuing options in size on an illiquid stock.

7. Conclusion

Corporates can utilise equity derivatives effectively and efficiently if they understand the risks involved. The risks are clear when simple payoff diagrams are used to analyse derivative structures. The three case studies show that prudent corporates can utilise options on equities for corporate action events - to fund the purchase of a stake in another company or to sell a shareholding in a company efficiently and lock in returns. On the other hand, if the risks are not understood and risk management practises not adequate, a corporate can loose a substantial amount of money


Bibliography

[1] C Smith, Equity derivatives enter the dialogue, The Banker, June (2002)

[2] J. Hull, Options, Futures, and other Derivatives, Prentice-Hall (1997)

[3] A. A. Kotzé, Equity Derivatives: effective and practical techniques for mastering and
trading equity derivatives, a Financial Chaos Theory publication, June (2002)

[4] A. A. Kotzé, The Practical Application of Equity Derivatives for Fund Managers and Corporates, a Financial Chaos Theory publication, August (2003)

[5] J. K. Glassman, Long Term Capital Management: Summary of the Nature of LTCM, http://www2.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/ltcm.htm

[6] D. Shireff, Lessons from the collapse of hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, http://riskinstitute.ch/146480.htm


This article is published for general information and is not intended as advice of any nature. The viewpoints expressed are not necessarily that of Financial Chaos Theory Pty. Ltd. As every situation depends on its own facts and circumstances, only specific advice should be relied upon.

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