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SocGen: Another History Lesson
By Ingrid Goodspeed
Governor, SAIFM

n 24 January 2008 Société Générale (SocGen), France’s second largest bank, announced that it had suffered a trading loss of €4.9billion (USD7.1 billion) – the biggest trading loss in banking history. The loss was as a result of a nominal position of about €50billion amassed by a single trader, Jerome Kerviel.

Kerviel was employed to carry out arbitrage trading, which is the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or equivalent or correlated securities in different markets at different prices, in order to profit from the price differences between markets. Since these price differences are usually tiny, large nominal positions (such as €50billion) must be taken to generate meaningful profits. Arbitrage trading is generally considered a low-risk trading strategy. Regrettably, Kerviel departed from his sanctioned arbitrage trading and instead set up directional positions on-exchange. He disguised the fact that these were not arbitrage trades by creating fictitious equal and opposite directional positions.

The report of a Special Committee of the Board of Directors of SocGen ascribed the bank’s failure to identify the fraud “firstly to the efficiency and variety of the concealment techniques employed by the fraudster, secondly to the fact that operating staff did not systematically carry out more detailed checks and finally to the absence of certain controls that were not provided for and which might have identified the fraud”. In other words, to an experienced and skilled trader with reprehensible motives combined with inappropriate risk governance and internal controls systems.

Unfortunately this is a recurring theme. The table below shows historic trading losses since 1995. In all these cases failure to prevent the losses has been ascribed to an inappropriate risk management and / or internal controls environment.

Historic trading losses
Year
USD
(billion)
Country
Institution
1995
1.3
United Kingdom
Barings Bank
1995
1.1
Japan
Daiwa Bank
1996
2.6
Japan
Sumitomo Corporation
1997
0.7
United Kingdom
Morgan Grenfell
1997
0.2
United Kingdom
NatWest
1998
4.6
United States
Long Term Capital Management
1998
0.5
Switzerland
United Bank of Switzerland
2000
1.9
Austria
BAWAG
2000
0.4
United States
Manhattan Investment Fund
2001
0.4
Netherlands
Dexia Bank
2002
0.7
United States
Allied Irish Bank
2004
0.6
China
China Aviation Oil
2004
0.4
Austria
Hypo Alpe Adria
2004
0.3
Australia
National Australian Bank
2005
0.2
China
State Reserves Bureau
2006
6.5
Canada
Amaranth Advisors
2007
0.6
United States
Bank of Montreal
2007
0.4
United States
Calyon Investment Bank
2007
0.1
Sweden
Carnegie Investment Bank
2007
0.8
Germany
WestLandesbank
2008
0.1
United States
MF Global
2008
7.1
France
Société Générale
Source: www.erisk.com, www.en.wikipedia.org

Although each case has unique characteristics, there are general lessons to be learned. In terms of risk management:

  • The board of directors and senior management must ensure they understand the nature and level of risk being undertaken and that these risks are taken within the risk appetite, strategy and limits that the board has (or should have) approved.
  • Institutions should ensure their trading and risk management models are appropriately validated, stress tested and back tested, particularly in respect of models that mark-to-model illiquid and / or opaque transactions and trading positions.
  • Trading strategies or trading in financial instruments that are new to the institution should undergo a review and approval process to ensure that the institution understands their market risk characteristics and can incorporate them into its risk management process.
  • An independent risk measurement and management information system should be in place to aggregate trading risk, measure market risk exposure and provide comprehensive risk reporting. The sophistication of the system should match the level of risk and complexity of trading activity.

From an internal controls point of view:

  • Exposure monitoring should focus on gross as well as net positions since gross notional amounts reflect the extent of the institution's financial commitment.
  • A proper audit trail must be in place for every trade by every trader.
  • Deal amendments, trade anomalies, processing errors and trade cancellations should be carefully identified and analysed.
  • Trades should always be confirmed, both with internal counterparties and with counterparties outside the institution.
  • Control procedures should make it possible to identify traders’ trading profiles and spot unusual behaviour such as no holidays taken or holidays taken but with out-of-office trading.
  • The types of trades that each trader is permitted to perform should always be specified clearly in writing.
  • Over-the-counter derivatives trades and illiquid and / or complex transactions and trading positions should be given particular attention.
  • Information systems need to be protected against intrusion. Procedures around system access should be approved by senior management.
  • A number of trading practices such as private-account trading, off-market trading, off-premises trading, out-of-hours trading and dealing at non-market rates may create conflicts of interest and conceal fraud, money laundering or other illegal activities. These practices should either be prohibited or controlled and monitored through sound policies and controls.
  • Segregation of duties between front, back and middle office is essential. In addition middle- and back-office staff should have sufficient expertise and experience to avoid becoming a “rubber stamp” to the front office.

Kerviel is just the latest in a long roll-call of traders to have cost their employers dearly in terms of both earnings and reputation. The worst cases have resulted in the failure of the institution. Perhaps it is time to learn the lessons from history. In the words of George Santayana "those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it".

Bibliography
Ministry of Finance. 2008. Report to the Prime Minister of France on the conclusions to be drawn from recent events at Société Générale.
Goodspeed, I. 2007. Introduction to Corporate Treasury Management. Unpublished.
SocGen. 2008. Progress report of the Committee of the Board of Directors of Société Générale.

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