SocGen:
Another History Lesson
By Ingrid Goodspeed
Governor, SAIFM

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24 January 2008 Société Générale
(SocGen), France’s second largest bank, announced that
it had suffered a trading loss of €4.9billion (USD7.1
billion) – the biggest trading loss in banking history.
The loss was as a result of a nominal position of about €50billion
amassed by a single trader, Jerome Kerviel.
Kerviel was employed to carry out arbitrage
trading, which is the simultaneous purchase and sale of the
same or equivalent or correlated securities in different markets
at different prices, in order to profit from the price differences
between markets. Since these price differences are usually
tiny, large nominal positions (such as €50billion) must
be taken to generate meaningful profits. Arbitrage trading
is generally considered a low-risk trading strategy. Regrettably,
Kerviel departed from his sanctioned arbitrage trading and
instead set up directional positions on-exchange. He disguised
the fact that these were not arbitrage trades by creating
fictitious equal and opposite directional positions.
The report of a Special Committee of the
Board of Directors of SocGen ascribed the bank’s failure
to identify the fraud “firstly to the efficiency and
variety of the concealment techniques employed by the fraudster,
secondly to the fact that operating staff did not systematically
carry out more detailed checks and finally to the absence
of certain controls that were not provided for and which might
have identified the fraud”. In other words, to an experienced
and skilled trader with reprehensible motives combined with
inappropriate risk governance and internal controls systems.
Unfortunately this is a recurring theme.
The table below shows historic trading losses since 1995.
In all these cases failure to prevent the losses has been
ascribed to an inappropriate risk management and / or internal
controls environment.
| Historic trading losses |
Year |
USD
(billion) |
Country |
Institution |
1995
|
1.3 |
United Kingdom |
Barings Bank |
| 1995 |
1.1 |
Japan
|
Daiwa Bank |
| 1996 |
2.6 |
Japan |
Sumitomo Corporation |
| 1997 |
0.7 |
United Kingdom
|
Morgan Grenfell |
| 1997 |
0.2 |
United Kingdom |
NatWest |
| 1998 |
4.6 |
United States
|
Long Term Capital Management |
| 1998 |
0.5 |
Switzerland |
United Bank of Switzerland |
| 2000 |
1.9 |
Austria |
BAWAG |
| 2000 |
0.4 |
United States
|
Manhattan Investment Fund |
| 2001 |
0.4 |
Netherlands |
Dexia Bank |
| 2002 |
0.7 |
United States |
Allied Irish Bank |
| 2004 |
0.6 |
China
|
China Aviation Oil |
2004 |
0.4 |
Austria |
Hypo Alpe Adria |
| 2004 |
0.3 |
Australia |
National Australian Bank |
2005 |
0.2 |
China |
State Reserves Bureau |
| 2006 |
6.5 |
Canada |
Amaranth Advisors |
| 2007 |
0.6 |
United States
|
Bank of Montreal |
| 2007 |
0.4 |
United States |
Calyon Investment Bank |
| 2007 |
0.1 |
Sweden |
Carnegie Investment Bank |
| 2007 |
0.8 |
Germany |
WestLandesbank |
| 2008 |
0.1 |
United States |
MF Global |
| 2008 |
7.1 |
France
|
Société Générale |
| Source: www.erisk.com, www.en.wikipedia.org |
Although each case has unique characteristics,
there are general lessons to be learned. In terms of risk
management:
- The board of directors and senior management must ensure
they understand the nature and level of risk being undertaken
and that these risks are taken within the risk appetite,
strategy and limits that the board has (or should have)
approved.
- Institutions should ensure their trading and risk management
models are appropriately validated, stress tested and
back tested, particularly in respect of models that mark-to-model
illiquid and / or opaque transactions and trading positions.
- Trading strategies or trading in financial instruments
that are new to the institution should undergo a review
and approval process to ensure that the institution understands
their market risk characteristics and can incorporate
them into its risk management process.
- An independent risk measurement and management information
system should be in place to aggregate trading risk, measure
market risk exposure and provide comprehensive risk reporting.
The sophistication of the system should match the level
of risk and complexity of trading activity.
From an internal controls point of view:
- Exposure monitoring should focus on gross as well as
net positions since gross notional amounts reflect the
extent of the institution's financial commitment.
- A proper audit trail must be in place for every trade
by every trader.
- Deal amendments, trade anomalies, processing errors
and trade cancellations should be carefully identified
and analysed.
- Trades should always be confirmed, both with internal
counterparties and with counterparties outside the institution.
- Control procedures should make it possible to identify
traders’ trading profiles and spot unusual behaviour
such as no holidays taken or holidays taken but with out-of-office
trading.
- The types of trades that each trader is permitted to
perform should always be specified clearly in writing.
- Over-the-counter derivatives trades and illiquid and
/ or complex transactions and trading positions should
be given particular attention.
- Information systems need to be protected against intrusion.
Procedures around system access should be approved by
senior management.
- A number of trading practices such as private-account
trading, off-market trading, off-premises trading, out-of-hours
trading and dealing at non-market rates may create conflicts
of interest and conceal fraud, money laundering or other
illegal activities. These practices should either be prohibited
or controlled and monitored through sound policies and
controls.
- Segregation of duties between front, back and middle
office is essential. In addition middle- and back-office
staff should have sufficient expertise and experience
to avoid becoming a “rubber stamp” to the
front office.
Kerviel is just the latest in a long roll-call
of traders to have cost their employers dearly in terms of
both earnings and reputation. The worst cases have resulted
in the failure of the institution. Perhaps it is time to learn
the lessons from history. In the words of George Santayana
"those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat
it".
Bibliography
Ministry of Finance. 2008. Report to the Prime Minister of
France on the conclusions to be drawn from recent events at
Société Générale.
Goodspeed, I. 2007. Introduction to Corporate Treasury Management.
Unpublished.
SocGen. 2008. Progress report of the Committee of the Board
of Directors of Société Générale.
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