The
Sub-prime Market Meltdown … continued
By Ingrid Goodspeed
Governor SAIFM

 he
article “Overview of the sub-prime market meltdown”
in the October 2007 edition of the South African Financial
Market Journal ended with the statement “it is evident
the sub-prime meltdown has not yet run its full course’.
Six months later this statement remains factual.
To recap: the market turbulence that began
in July 2007 originated initially from the deteriorating US
sub-prime mortgage market with weak loan origination standards
contributing to rising delinquencies. The turmoil rapidly
spread to other markets starting with collaterised debt obligations
(CDOs) that had invested heavily in sub-prime retail mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS). As credit rating agencies announced widespread
downgrades of sub-prime RMBS, the asset-backed securities
(ABSs) market seized up as investors, realising the risk they
were running, abandoned mortgage-backed securities and even
traditional asset-backed commercial paper. Commercial paper
issuers were forced to draw on their liquidity facilities
with banks. In addition many banks, as underwriters of ABSs,
were left holding warehoused exposures. And the credit event
rapidly morphed into a liquidity event. Liquidity pressures
quickly spread to the interbank market as banks became concerned
about their capital adequacy and the size of their balance
sheets. Questions about the credit worthiness of some banks
made banks reluctant to provide each other with funding. In
December 2007 several monoline insurers, which provided credit
default insurance to ABSs, came under pressure.
Specific key events from July 2008 to date
(April 2008) are shown in the graph below against the FTSE/JSE
All-share and S&P500 indices.

The International Monetary Fund warned that
the fallout from the sub-prime crises is widening and deepening
and that potential losses could reach USD945bn and more. Thus
far realised losses include the failure of two banks (Northern
Rock and Bear Stearns). In addition sub-prime losses have
been announced by a number of prominent international banks.
These are shown in the table below.
| Main sub-prime losses to date
(USD bn) |
| UBS |
19.0 |
| Citigroup |
18.0 |
| HSBC |
17.2 |
| Merrill Lynch |
14.1 |
| Morgan Stanley |
9.4 |
| Bear Stearns |
3.2 |
| Deutsche Bank |
3.2 |
| JP Morgan Chase |
3.2 |
| Bank of America |
3.0 |
| Barclays |
2.6 |
| Royal Bank of Scotland |
2.6 |
| IKB |
2.6 |
| Freddie Mac |
2.0 |
| Credit Suisse |
1.8 |
| Wachovia |
1.1 |
| Source: www.bc.co.uk |
Two South African banks experienced losses
related to sub-prime contagion. Rand Merchant Bank (RMB),
the investment banking arm of FirstRand, experienced trading
losses of US$200 million in its international portfolios.
The performance of Investec was negatively impacted by write
downs of £36 million on US structured credit investments.
Standard Bank, Nedbank and Absa Bank have no direct exposure
to US sub-prime mortgages.
Among the lessons learned from the crises
are:
- Because of the increasingly-complex and deepening financial
and economic linkages across global economies, liquidity,
funding and credit problems in one area of the global
financial system will spread rapidly to other areas.
- The complexity and weak disclosure in respect of structured
finance products contributed to the duration and depth
of the crisis.
- Many financial institutions – banking and non-banking
– became complacent about liquidity risk management.
This was evident from their dependence on wholesale funding
and implicit reliance on central bank intervention to
meet emergency liquidity requirements.
Policy responses to these lessons include:
- Manage systemic risk by limiting the spread of the
disruption to other markets (in particular emerging markets)
and repairing the balance sheets of banks as the crises
has weakened the capital and funding of international
systemically-important institutions.
- Robust and rigorous valuation standards should be adopted
for structured finance products. Such standards should
consider related internal controls and governance mechanisms
and disclosure.
- Banks should improve their liquidity risk management.
Enhancements are required at bank and group level in respect
of internal governance mechanisms, stress-testing and
contingency planning. In addition adequate supervisory
resources should be dedicated to liquidity supervision.
In its latest World Economic Outlook, the
IMF predicts global growth will, in the wake of the sub-prime
market crisis, slow to 3.7% in 2008. It suggests the United
States and other developed economies will lead the slowdown.
Emerging market will not be insulated from the downturn but
it is expected that their growth rates will remain above long-term
trends.
The South African Reserve Bank believes South
Africa has been relatively insulated thus far. For example,
interbank lending has continued without disruption and interbank
credit spreads have not widened significantly. However the
SARB acknowledges that a slowdown in growth in the United
States will spill over to the rest of the world, including
South Africa.
It is evident the sub-prime meltdown has
not yet run its full course.
Bibliography
IMF. 2008. World Economic Outlook. www.imf.org.
IMF. 2008. Global Financial Stability Report. www.imf.org
CEBS. 2008. Hearing at the economic and monetary affairs committee
of the European Parliament. www cebs.org
SARB.2008. T T Mboweni: Origins and causes of recent financial
market turbulence and its implications for the CMA. www.bis.org
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