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The Sub-prime Market Meltdown … continued
By Ingrid Goodspeed
Governor SAIFM

he article “Overview of the sub-prime market meltdown” in the October 2007 edition of the South African Financial Market Journal ended with the statement “it is evident the sub-prime meltdown has not yet run its full course’. Six months later this statement remains factual.

To recap: the market turbulence that began in July 2007 originated initially from the deteriorating US sub-prime mortgage market with weak loan origination standards contributing to rising delinquencies. The turmoil rapidly spread to other markets starting with collaterised debt obligations (CDOs) that had invested heavily in sub-prime retail mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). As credit rating agencies announced widespread downgrades of sub-prime RMBS, the asset-backed securities (ABSs) market seized up as investors, realising the risk they were running, abandoned mortgage-backed securities and even traditional asset-backed commercial paper. Commercial paper issuers were forced to draw on their liquidity facilities with banks. In addition many banks, as underwriters of ABSs, were left holding warehoused exposures. And the credit event rapidly morphed into a liquidity event. Liquidity pressures quickly spread to the interbank market as banks became concerned about their capital adequacy and the size of their balance sheets. Questions about the credit worthiness of some banks made banks reluctant to provide each other with funding. In December 2007 several monoline insurers, which provided credit default insurance to ABSs, came under pressure.

Specific key events from July 2008 to date (April 2008) are shown in the graph below against the FTSE/JSE All-share and S&P500 indices.

The International Monetary Fund warned that the fallout from the sub-prime crises is widening and deepening and that potential losses could reach USD945bn and more. Thus far realised losses include the failure of two banks (Northern Rock and Bear Stearns). In addition sub-prime losses have been announced by a number of prominent international banks. These are shown in the table below.

Main sub-prime losses to date (USD bn)
UBS 19.0
Citigroup 18.0
HSBC 17.2
Merrill Lynch 14.1
Morgan Stanley 9.4
Bear Stearns 3.2
Deutsche Bank 3.2
JP Morgan Chase 3.2
Bank of America 3.0
Barclays 2.6
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.6
IKB 2.6
Freddie Mac 2.0
Credit Suisse 1.8
Wachovia 1.1
Source: www.bc.co.uk

Two South African banks experienced losses related to sub-prime contagion. Rand Merchant Bank (RMB), the investment banking arm of FirstRand, experienced trading losses of US$200 million in its international portfolios. The performance of Investec was negatively impacted by write downs of £36 million on US structured credit investments. Standard Bank, Nedbank and Absa Bank have no direct exposure to US sub-prime mortgages.

Among the lessons learned from the crises are:

  • Because of the increasingly-complex and deepening financial and economic linkages across global economies, liquidity, funding and credit problems in one area of the global financial system will spread rapidly to other areas.
  • The complexity and weak disclosure in respect of structured finance products contributed to the duration and depth of the crisis.
  • Many financial institutions – banking and non-banking – became complacent about liquidity risk management. This was evident from their dependence on wholesale funding and implicit reliance on central bank intervention to meet emergency liquidity requirements.

Policy responses to these lessons include:

  • Manage systemic risk by limiting the spread of the disruption to other markets (in particular emerging markets) and repairing the balance sheets of banks as the crises has weakened the capital and funding of international systemically-important institutions.
  • Robust and rigorous valuation standards should be adopted for structured finance products. Such standards should consider related internal controls and governance mechanisms and disclosure.
  • Banks should improve their liquidity risk management. Enhancements are required at bank and group level in respect of internal governance mechanisms, stress-testing and contingency planning. In addition adequate supervisory resources should be dedicated to liquidity supervision.

In its latest World Economic Outlook, the IMF predicts global growth will, in the wake of the sub-prime market crisis, slow to 3.7% in 2008. It suggests the United States and other developed economies will lead the slowdown. Emerging market will not be insulated from the downturn but it is expected that their growth rates will remain above long-term trends.

The South African Reserve Bank believes South Africa has been relatively insulated thus far. For example, interbank lending has continued without disruption and interbank credit spreads have not widened significantly. However the SARB acknowledges that a slowdown in growth in the United States will spill over to the rest of the world, including South Africa.

It is evident the sub-prime meltdown has not yet run its full course.

Bibliography
IMF. 2008. World Economic Outlook. www.imf.org.
IMF. 2008. Global Financial Stability Report. www.imf.org
CEBS. 2008. Hearing at the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament. www cebs.org
SARB.2008. T T Mboweni: Origins and causes of recent financial market turbulence and its implications for the CMA. www.bis.org

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