Global
financial crisis: What happened and what happens next?
By Ingrid Goodspeed
Governor, SAIFM

 he
market turbulence that began in July 2007 with the sub-prime
market meltdown, led to financial market panic in September
2008 with the bankruptcy of Wall Street investment bank Lehman
Brothers and the bailout of insurer American International
Group (AIG). Credit markets seized up and liquidity evaporated
even further. Confidence in financial institutions crumbled.
The economic downturn accelerated and global economic growth
fell steeply together with a slowdown in worldwide trade.
In its January 2009 Global Financial Stability
Market Update Report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
stated that the global financial system is under extreme stress
and that risks to financial stability have increased. This
despite the provision of liquidity support to banks; the cutting
of policy rates; and the injection of capital into the banking
system by both private (USD450billion) and public (USD380billion)
sectors.
Causes of the crisis have been mooted by
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the IMF and authorities in the European Union (EU),
United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK). These are described
under two main headings: global macroeconomic imbalances and
the failure of market mechanisms.
Global
macroeconomic imbalances
In the last decade oil-exporting countries,
China, Japan and other east Asian countries (“surplus
countries”) have built up large current account surpluses
while vast current account deficits have accumulated in the
US, UK and certain other developed economies (“deficit
countries”). The key driver of these imbalances has
been the high rate of savings relative to investment in surplus
countries and a lack of savings relative to investment in
deficit countries. Savings flowed from surplus countries to
deficit countries and interest rates reached historically
low levels.
The effect of low interest rates was two-fold.
Firstly they led to rapid growth of credit extension and associated
asset price booms in developed countries - particularly the
US and the UK. Secondly they produced a relentless search
for yield among investors. This in turn stimulated a wave
of financial innovation that focussed on the creation of structured
financial products around the securitisation of credit instruments
such as residential mortgages, including sub-prime mortgages.
Failure
of market mechanisms
Causes of the crisis that reflect the
failure of market mechanisms and discipline include the following:
1. The risk governance and risk management
process(1) of banks and other financial firms failed:
- The complexity of structured financial products made
appropriate risk identification, assessment and measurement
difficult. In addition mathematical risk and valuation
models underestimated exposure to shocks and extreme
tail events;
- Banks underestimated liquidity risk(2) both in terms
of business as usual (borrowing short and lending long)
and stressed market conditions;
- Remuneration and incentives schemes encouraged excessive
risk taking;
- Boards and senior management did not appreciate and
execute their oversight role; including understanding
the banks’ risk profiles. They did not understand
the characteristics nor aggregate exposure of the complex
structured products their banks were dealing in;
2. Credit rating agencies underestimated
the credit default risk of structured financial products.
This was exacerbated by the conflict of interest inherent
in the rating process – issuers simply shopped around
until they achieved a AAA rating;
3. Regulatory / supervisory oversight of
the financial sector was inadequate:
- Supervisors placed too much reliance on the risk
management capabilities of financial firms and banks
and on the adequacy of ratings;
- Little was known about the size or ownership of credit
risk. Securitisation aimed to distribute risks across
the financial system. However lack of transparency made
it difficult to assess whether risk had been spread
or merely concentrated in less visible sections of the
financial system e.g., in the so-called shadow banking
system;
- In terms of liquidity, supervisors did not give enough
consideration to the impact of financial-market developments
on the markets as a whole and on contagion and systemic
risk in particular. Instead they focussed on individual
firms;
- Once the situation escalated into a crisis, the authorities’
response was undermined by an inadequate crisis management
infrastructure between national regulators and supervisors
and between public authorities within countries namely
central banks, finance ministries and bank or financial
firm supervisors;
The shadow banking system –investment
banks, mortgage brokers/originators, hedge funds, securitization
vehicles and other private asset pools – was loosely
regulated and not subject to the prudential regulation that
applied to banks. This was because it was not considered systemically
important. It being unregulated made it attractive for banks
to evade capital requirements by transferring risk to their
affiliates in the shadow banking system. By the start of the
crisis the size of the shadow system had grown as large as
the formal banking system, which meant that major failures
here would in fact be systemic.
What happens
now?
The question arises - what should be done to lift the global
economy out of recession and prevent a similar crisis from
happening again?
To resolve the crisis in the short-term, the IMF suggests
a three-fold approach:
- The provision of plentiful liquidity and short-term funding
support from central banks;
- Bank recapitalisation; and
- Measures to deal with problem assets.
Suggested longer-term policy and regulatory / supervisory
initiatives are shown in the table below:
| Global macroeconomic imbalances |
- Better analysis and response to problems lying
at the interface between macroeconomic policy and
financial systems;
- Use of both macro and structural policies impacting
savings and investment;
- Prudential measures to curb systemic risk.
|
| Bank’s risk governance and risk management
process |
- Changes to capital requirements in respect of:
- trading book exposures, including complex
and illiquid credit products;
- complex securitisations in the banking book
(e.g. collateralised debt obligations of asset-backed
securities; and
- exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles such
as asset-backed commercial paper conduits;
- Avoid procyclicality in the implementation of
Basel II to decrease the extent to which lending
capacity is reduced in economic downturns;
- Improved stress testing, scenario analysis and
model validation;
- Ensure more meticulous risk management of risk
concentrations, off-balance sheet exposures, securitisations
and related reputation risks.
|
| Complex structured products |
Securitised and derivative products should be standardised,
simplified, traded on a formal exchange and cleared
and settled via a resilient and central clearing house.
|
| Remuneration and incentives schemes |
Remuneration systems and incentives schemes should
be risk-based and linked to the strategy and risk appetite
of the firm as well as its longer term interests. |
| Boards and senior management oversight |
- Improve board oversight of risk management;
- Improve skill level and time commitment of non-executive
directors;
- Provide proper incentives for the board and management
to pursue objectives that are in the interests of
the company and its shareholders;
- Require the board to exercise objective and independent
judgment.
|
| Credit rating agencies |
- Supervise credit rating agencies;
- Review role of credit rating agents in financial
system;
- Improve approach to the rating of securitised
products.
|
| Regulatory / supervisory oversight |
- Ensure more effective and consolidated supervision
of large and complex financial firms;
- Recognise that the regulation of liquidity is
as important as that in respect capital adequacy;
- Bank regulation and supervision should be supported
by a retail deposit insurance system;
- A crisis management infrastructure should be set
up between:
- national regulators and supervisors; and
- public authorities within countries namely
central banks, finance ministries and bank or
financial firm supervisors;
- Undertake more rigorous supervision of risk concentrations,
off-balance sheet exposures and securitisations.
|
| Shadow banking system |
Regulate entities according to their activities and
not their legal form. |
Many of these suggestions were incorporated
into the final communication from the G20 summit in London.
The Leaders’ Statement of 2 April 2009 pledged to do
what is necessary to “restore confidence, growth, and
jobs; repair the financial system to restore lending; strengthen
financial regulation to rebuild trust; fund and reform international
financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent
future ones; promote global trade and investment and reject
protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and build an inclusive,
green, and sustainable recovery”.
In 2003 Christopher Fildes, journalist at
the Telegraph wrote: “My law of the financial cycle
says that things go wrong when the last man who can remember
what happened last time has retired”. Unfortunately
history teaches that few generations have avoided repeating
earlier financial crises.
(1)The
risk management process includes the identification, assessment
and measurement, management and control, reporting and monitoring
of risk
(2) There are two types of
liquidity risk: market liquidity risk and funding liquidity
risk. Market liquidity risk is the risk that the bank cannot
easily offset or eliminate a market position without significantly
affecting the market price because of inadequate market depth
or market disruption. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that
the bank will not be able to efficiently meet both expected
and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral
needs without affecting either daily operations or the financial
condition of the bank.
Bibliography
- IMF. January 2009. Global financial stability
report: market update.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fmu/eng/2009/01/index.htm
- IMF. February 2009. Initial lessons of
the crisis. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020609.pdf
- European Commission. February 2009. The
high-level group on financial supervision in the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20090225_en.pdf.
- Financial Services Authority. March 2009.
The Turner review: A regulatory response to the global
banking crisis.
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
- Bernanke, B.S. March 2009. Speech titled
Financial reform to address systemic risk. http://www.bis.org/review/r090313a.pdf
- King, M. March 2009. Speech titled Finance-
a return from risk. http://www.bis.org/review/r090319a.pdf
- G20, April 2009. London Summit –
Leaders’ Statement. www.g20.org
Websites
- www.bis.org
- www.economist.com
- www.imf.org
- www.oecd.org
- www.worldbank.org
|